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1Independence, a long process that was completed by 1825, is recurrently
associated to the gap in living standards between Latin America and developed
countries.1 Pessimist assessments of Latin American post-colonial performance that
depict the half a century after independence as ‘lost decades’, stem largely from the
contrast with the United States.2 The view of economic stagnation and political turmoil
The purpose of this paper is to challenge this view by assessing the connections
between independence and the origins of economic backwardness in Latin America. To
do so I will confront the detailed but scattered research at national level with the grand
interpretations of Latin America’s historical patterns of development in international
perspective.3
The paper is organized as follows, I, first, to investigate the effects of
independence across Latin America, that result from removing the colonial burden
(section I), and opening up to the international economy (section II), and, then, I look at
the aggregate impact on the economy of the new republics (section III). Later, I use a
comparative and highly intuitive approach to examine whether long-term retardation in
Latin America is related to the way independence occurred (section IV). Some remarks
close the paper. The main findings can be summarized as follows:
a) The release of the fiscal burden of the Imperial system was partly offset in the
new countries by the higher costs of governing themselves.
b) The integration into the world economy brought net gains to Latin American
economies over the long run.
c) On the whole, during the years 1820-70, Latin American GDP per head
experienced moderate growth. When compared to the U.S. and Western Europe Latin
America’s position deteriorated, but remained unaltered with respect to the European
2Periphery and clearly improved with respect to Africa and Asia. Hence, ‘lost decades’
seems an unwarranted depiction of this period.
The demise of the colonial rule and state formation
Independence brought with it the release of the colonial fiscal and trade burden.
The colonial fiscal burden consisted of the taxes levied on the indigenous population
and included the Indies’ remittances, or surpluses of the colonial administration that
were sent to Spain. In the 1790s, it represented more than half of all the sums sent to
Spain from Latin American colonies.4 By 1800 residents in Bourbon Mexico paid more
taxes than Spaniards in the metropolis and were making, therefore, a significant
contribution to the imperial administration.5 John Coatsworth conjectured that the fiscal
burden represented 4.2 percent of Mexican GDP by 1800.6 Removing colonial rule
eliminated the fiscal burden and, ceteris paribus, added to Latin American GDP.
However, if the net gain for Latin America is to be estimated, an increase in the
costs of administering many, not a single political unit has to be taken on board. The
fragmentation of the initial national divisions took place soon after independence.7
Monetary and fiscal disintegration brought by independence produced the
demise of the largest monetary union and fiscal structure in existence, contributed to
political fragmentation, and reflected in weak national administrations and increasing
transaction costs.8 Separation had negative effects in terms of economic efficiency:
commercial links among regions, however weak in colonial times, were no longer
guaranteed. Increasing market integration within the Spanish empire during the late
seventeenth and especially the eighteenth century, as shown by price convergence in the
Viceroyalty of Peru, came to a halt with independence.9 Intra-colonial fiscal transfers
were, according to Grafe and Irigoin, the successful basis of the colonial system.10
3After independence, unequal access to fiscal resources in the absence of intra-colonial
re-distribution of tax revenues provoked a struggle for the control of fiscal resources
and led to political strife. Costs in defence and law enforcement had to be duplicated,
and the coordination in the provision of public goods became more difficult.11 Each new
republic faced the challenge of creating a new fiscal and monetary system and a
domestic financial market. Customs duties became the backbone of the new fiscal
systems, as in post-independent United States.12 Unlike the U.S., however, most Latin
American governments suffered chronic deficits over the first half of the nineteenth
century as tax revenues stagnated and military expenses increased. In fact, fiscal policies
were subordinated to militaryand politicalcaudillos at the expense and dilution of tax
administration. A vicious cycle emerged in which fiscal weakness led to weak
government that led, in turn, to frequent challenges to the elite in power and, as a result,
civil strife proliferated.13 According to North, Summerhill and Weingast the break with
the metropolis destroyed many of the institutions that provided credible commitments to
rights and property within the Spanish empire.14 The lack of stabilizing institutions
made impossible to achieve efficient economic organization. Hence, a scramble to
preserve colonial protection and privileges or to secure new powers occurred.
Alas hard empirical evidence remains scant and only a few national testimonies
can be provided. In Mexico, the extraordinary rise in internal military expenditures, a
growing tendency to rely on forced loans, and the increasing fiscal autonomy of local
treasuries resulted in the destruction of the colonial treasury system.15 As a result local
credit markets became disintegrated. Meanwhile,public internal debt grew by nearly 40
per cent between 1823 and 1848, an outcome of growingpublic deficits (that reached up to
40 per cent of total government expenditure). Such a situation represented a break with the
past, as there were no deficits under colonial rule. In fact, there were transfersof surplus
4from one colony to another (situados).16 Independence led to the abolitionof two major
sources of income of the colonial administration: the Indian tribute tax (levied on all heads
of households in Indian towns) and mining taxes (10 per cent duty levied on all silver
produced). This reduced potential income of the state by almost 30 per cent.17 Instability
paralleled public debt growth leading arguably to crowding out private investment.18 A
negative association has been posited between political instability and economicgrowth in
the half century after Mexican independence.19
In the other main centre of the Spanish empire, Peru, independence took place
under different circumstances: foreign republican armies defeated royalist elites.
However, as in Mexico, the republican state, under chronic fiscal deficit, increased
taxation on mining making its recovery difficult. War destruction of fixed capital, fiscal
mismanagement and default, together with political turmoil, had a negative impact on
the economy.20 Independence, in the end, did not deliver the conditions for sustained
economic growth.
In another area of large indigenous population, Central America, political
instability and war affected the economy, including the destruction of capital, obstacles
to trade and transport, and insecurity for investors, while the government forced loans
from merchants.21 The prolonged transition to private property surely introduced
uncertainty that delayed investment in land improvement and increased transaction costs.22
Chile and Brazil behaved differently as they managed to create institutions that
protected groups from aggression and expropriation, although failed to achieve political
competition and cooperation among sub-national administrative entities.23 Colombia, in
turn, was successful in improving the colonial tax regime and, by 1850, had a much
more fair (head tax on Indians, taxes on public employees and alcabalas –a tax on all
5sales of domestic production- were eliminated), efficient (customs taxes mainly on
imports) and neutral fiscal system.24
In the former Viceroyalty of River Plate political stability and economic growth
were accomplished in Buenos Aires and Uruguay, while stagnation and political
instability prevailed in the interior.25 The Buenos Aires economy profited from the
disappearance of a fiscal system that created disincentives for productive activities.
Stable political institutions that allowed contract enforcement were introduced.26 Rosas
dictatorship restricted property and free trade, but lack of political freedom did not
imply, however, total suppression of economic freedom. In the interior provinces the
principles of economic freedom were not easily accepted. Only in the 1853 constitution
was national organization on the basis of economic freedom widely accepted while its
enforcement took another thirty years.
The provinces of the Viceroyalty of River Plate failed to devise an incentive
structure to keep them voluntarily united under a single government and to take
advantage of economies of scale in the provision of defence and justice, reducing
transaction costs and encouraging economic development, as the separation of Uruguay
and Paraguay revealed. Military threats and trade blockades had long lasting economic
and political consequences on Paraguay leading to public finance crisis and economic
contraction and to the political demise of proponents of more representative
governments and freer trade. They also gave rise to political absolutism and
redistribution of property towards the state.27 Economic activity in the three decades
following independence fell below the levels reached in the late colonial period.
To sum up, reallocating resources from a big closed economy, the colonial
empire, to small and, often, open economies such as the new republics implied a non
negligible cost. The colonial empire provided security and justice at a cost not too high.
6With independence, new providers of protection emerged but with lower capacity than
the metropolis. Transaction costs increased independence as political and economic
institutions went through a period of turmoil and re-definition, while continued violence
between and within countries also contributed to less well defined property rights.
These costs were higher for the new republics because of fragmentation and the loss of
economies of scale. Moreover, a single fiscal system within a monetary and customs
union, such as the Spanish empire, represented significant savings compared to multiple
national fiscal and monetary units created by colonial independence. On the whole, until
the mid-nineteenth century the benefits derived from removing the fiscal burden
overcame were partly offset by the increasing costs of providing their own
governments.
Opening up to the international economy
The release of the trade burden imposed by the colonial system allowed the new
Latin American countries to have access to expanding world commodityand factor
markets. Coatsworth reckoned that the trade burden represented up to 3 percent of New
Spain’s GDP.28 Independence allowed the Latin American republics to trade directlywith
Europe and North America and it represented a reduction in transportation and
commercialisation costs that, ceteris paribus, increased the volume traded. However, in the
decades following independence warfare and political instability made the adjustment to
the new international trade regime difficult. Similarly, tariff protection resulting from the
new republics’ budget constraints probablydiminished the positive impact from the
removal of Iberian commercial monopolies.
Trade theories suggest a series of testable hypotheses as regards the
consequences to Latin American countries of opening up to the world economy. As a
7result of getting rid of the trade burden a new ‘frontier’ opened up in which land expanded
at a rising cost in termsof other resources.29 An expansion of trade would, then, be
expected and, through a better resource allocation, an increase in output. Terms of trade
might decline, according to the Prebisch School, as Latin America exported primary
goods and imported manufactured produce, although, in the light of Classical
economists, the opposite would occur.30 At the same time, changes in income
distribution should take place, with a tendency for within-country inequality to rise as
the reward to land, the abundant and less evenly distributed factor, improves relative to
labour.31 Lastly, a worsening of Latin American position in the world economy can be
predicted.32
Locationmattered much in the nineteenth century as the tyranny of distance was
a determinant factor of trade -in particular, prior to the construction of railways (only in
a large scale after 1870)-, despite the sharp reduction in ocean freight and insurance
rates. Relative rather than absolute transport costs from alternative locations were what
really mattered. Freights rates from Antwerp to Rio de Janeiro in 1850 were only 40
percent of those prevailing in 1820, but freight rates from Antwerp to New York fell
even more, to one-fourth. Meanwhile, insurance rates were cut to one-half and to one-
third for trips from Rio and Buenos Aires, respectively, to Antwerp.33 Transport costs
from Antwerp to Buenos Aires and Rio remained relatively stable over 1850-70 but
those to Valparaiso, on the Pacific Rim, fell by 40 per cent, as a consequence of the
convergence of transport costs to the Pacific with those to the Atlantic façade of Latin
America’s Southern Cone.34
Geographic constraints imply different outcomes of exposition to international
trade across regions. Coastal regions, densely populated and with temperate climate
would be at advantage to landlocked hinterlands in tropical areas, as migration and
8infrastructure development become more difficult and incentives exist for coastal
economies to impose costs on them.35 Landlocked economies such as Bolivia and
Paraguay, the interior regions of Mexico, Colombia, Brazil and Argentina, and Andean
countries such Ecuador and Peru were clearly at disadvantage relative to coastal
regions. In addition, countries on the Pacific Rim had a transport cost disadvantage over
those on the Atlantic façade. Table 1 provides some insights about the overall transport
costs that emphasize the importance of internal costs of transportation.
INSERT TABLE 1
Wide regional discrepancies in the degree of integration in the international
economy would be expected. In Mexico, independence ended laws restricting
immigration and capital inflows and brought an increase in openness (the relative size
of trade went up, according to Coatsworth, from 8.1 percent of GDP in 1800 to 12.3
percent by 1845), but arguably not when compared to the late colonial period.36
Meanwhile in Peru, mercantilist policies remained in place. After an episode of trade
expansion up to the mid-1820s, fixed prices, taxation, and protectionism remained an
obstacle to economic activity for decades. Only three decades later the stimulus of the
international demand (the guano boom) opened the country up.37 Qualitative evidence
on Central America suggests stagnation, but current imports from Britain almost
doubled (while its prices were practically halving) between two peaks (1826 and 1839)
to decline afterwards.38 There were limited incentives to trade as physical barriers
implied high transport costs. Independence brought a break of colonial commercial
networks and procedures. Links between regions of the Federation weakened as export
orientation increased. Together with political instability it led to the creation of five new
countries in 1839. An exogenous shock occurred as a consequence of U.S. assimilation
of California: new maritime routes through Panama isthmus, together with the Panama
9railroad (1855), led to a sharp decline in transport costs increasing trade and finance.39
In contrast to Spanish America, independence in Brazil did not involve a shift in the
direction of trade.40 The Buenos Aires economy profited from the disappearance of
colonial regulation that forced it to trade through the metropolis. From re-exporting
silver from Alto Peru Buenos Aires became an economy exporting livestock products.
The main consequence of independence was adding new lands to cultivation and
opening up to foreign trade.41
The hypothesis of an uneven impact of post-independence opening up to the
international economy can be tested with evidence on the purchasing power of exports
(current values of exports deflated by the price of imports) normalized by population
(Table 2).42 Location conditioned the importance of trade, with the Southern Cone and
the Caribbean ahead of the rest. The relative dispersion of per capita exports declined,
however, over the whole considered period. Evidence on capital inflows per head from
Britain, the main investing country in Latin America, confirms the integration of Latin
America, though uneven across countries, in the international capital market.43
INSERT TABLE 2
But at what pace did Latin America integrate in the international economy? Over
forty years, the purchasing power per Latin American inhabitant of both exports (1830-
70) and British investment (1825-75) increased noticeably, at an average annual rate of
growth of 1.5 and 3.5 percent, respectively (computed from Table 2). The purchasing
power of exports per capita accelerated after 1850 and its rate of growth moved from
1.2 percent in 1830-50 up to 1.8 over 1850-70, while British investment per Latin
American population took off after 1865, jumping from 2.1 percent per year over 1825-
65 to 9.1 percent in 1865-75, a phenomenon linked to government loans and, to a less
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extent, associated to the shift of foreign investment toward railroads construction and
public utilities.44
Evidence at national level on purchasing power of exports in terms of imports,
also known as income terms of trade, confirms these findings. Cuba’s income terms of
trade improved substantially (277 by 1867, 1826=100) due to supply increases in sugar
exports.45 In Mexico, no trend was exhibit during 1828-1851 but, then, a sharp
improvement took place up to the 1880s.46 In Colombia, real exports per capita doubled
between the late 1830s and 1880, while income terms of trade trebled between the
1830s and the 1860s.47 In Brazil, real exports per capita multiply by three between the
1820s and the 1850s and by four between the 1820s and 1870s, while income terms of
trade grew at an annual trend rate of 4.2 per cent over 1822-1849 (2.8 per cent in per
capita terms).48 Argentina also experienced a remarkable increase in the quantity and
the purchasing power of her exports.49 Chilean real per capita exports, in turn,
multiplied seven times between independence and 1870.50
The net barter terms of trade, that is, the ratio of export to import prices, provide
a measure of the purchasing power per unit of exports. Recent estimates for major Latin
American countries are presented in Table 3. In Mexico the net barter terms of trade
experienced a moderate improvement between 1828 and 1881 (at 1.4 percent per year)
and probably added 3 percent to GDP by 1860.51 Venezuela’s terms of trade followed
the Mexican pattern of stability over 1830-50, to deteriorate in the early fifties and to
recover in the seventies.52 In Chile, after a sharp rise and decline at the time of
independence, stability was the rule.53 Brazilian purchasing power per unit of exports
increased in three-fourths between 1826-30 and 1876-80.54 Colombian net barter terms
of trade improved as much as Brazil between the late 1830s and 1880.55 Richard and
Linda Salvucci were able, on the basis of Gootenberg’s data, to estimate that the net
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barter terms of trade of Peru were 47 per cent higher in the early 1850s than in the
1830s.56 Argentina’s terms of trade show an improvement that peaked in the late
1850s.57 The demand for exports increased due to international trade expansion and
European industrialization while the growth of inputs used by the pastoral economy and
a rise in productivity lie behind the supply expansion. Cuba provides the exception as
her net terms of trade deteriorated between 1826 and 1866 (by 50 per cent), and when
adjusted for productivity changes in the export sector (the so called single factorial
terms of trade) no trend appears between 1826 and 1846 to experiment, then, a decline
up to 1862 (by 61 per cent).58
INSERT TABLE 3
Evidence tends, therefore, to reject the view of deteriorating terms of trade that
hindered Latin American growth precisely at the time (1820s-1870s) when large
international disparities in per capita income began to emerge. Actually, it can be
suggested that the domestic terms of trade, that is, those perceived by the Latin
American population, should have improved more dramatically than the international
terms of trade as independence allowed to trade directly in world markets, colonial
tariffs were repealed and the new republics’ tariffs were often lower.59 Transport costs
and the increase in the scale of trade also helped to reduce margins in international
trade. On the combined evidence provided by the evolution of the relative price of
exports (Table 3) and the purchasing power of total exports (Table 2) the idea of
immiserizing growth can be rejected for most of Spanish America and for Brazil.60
The opening up to the international economy has been associated to a widening
of income differences within national boundaries and across countries. No much
evidence is available on the former for the pre-1870 period. Argentina represents the
exception. Newland and Ortiz have shown that the expansion in the pastoral sector
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resulting from improved terms of trade increased the reward of capital and land, the
most intensively used factors, while the farming sector contracted and the returns of its
intensive factor, labour, declined, as confirmed by the drop in nominal wages.61 A
redistribution of income in favour of owners of capital and land (estancieros) at the
expense of workers took place confirming empirically Stolper-Samuelson theoretical
predictions.62
To sum up, the release of the colonial trade burden had net gains for the
economies of Latin America as the evolution of quantities and prices of exported goods
does suggest. Although trade did not have the strength to pull along the economy as an
episode of export-led growth, it can be argued that, when it was not hindered by
geographic and institutional barriers, it facilitated economic growth.63 Trade in
nineteenth century Latin America, seems to have been, in most national cases, a
handmaiden of growth.64 In any case, recent claims by Bates, Coatsworth, and
Williamson that ‘Latin America failed to exploit the world trade boom between 1820
and 1870 [because of its] aggressive anti-trade policies’ and that, in the early nineteenth
century, ‘the growth rates of exports per capita were below 1 percent per annum’, are
firmly rejected by the empirical evidence presented here.65 Such rejection also applies to
their argument that foreign investment was just an ‘ephemeral investment cycle in the
early to mid 1820s’.
The aggregate impact of independence
Evidence on aggregate economic performance across countries shows a wide
variance. At the core of the colonial empire, Mexico and Peru, independence did not
deliver the conditions for sustained economic growth. War destruction of fixed capital,
financial capital flight, mining depression, fiscal mismanagement and increasing taxation,
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and political turmoil, all contributed negativelyto growth. Among the explanatory
hypotheses for sluggishperformance in Mexico and Peru are political instability and the
decline in silver production that did not recover until mid-nineteenth century both as a
result of the economic policies and changes in the international market for mercury.66
Quantitative guesses are available for Mexico’s economic performance. According
to Coatsworth, output per head fell at a yearly rate of nearly –0.6 per cent between 1800
and 1860.67 Salvucci, in turn, pointed that prolonged stagnation or, even, decline of per
capita income are appropriate depictions of Mexican economic performance over 1800-
40.68 More recently, Coatsworth has conceded that, after the decline during the
independence wars, a very mild recovery (0.2 percent per year) occurred between 1820
and 1845.69 Sánchez Santiró has gone further in the revision to sustain that economic
growth and population expansion occurred between 1820 and the mid-1850s, followed
by stagnation and even decline until 1870. He reckons that per capita income grew at
around 0.5 percent per year during the fifty years after independence to decline, then,
until the 1870s.70 This view is consistent with Richard and Linda Salvucci’s earlierclaim
that real output per head increased at 0.5 per cent annually over 1800-1840.71
Slavery economies offer a distinct and different behaviour. They did not undergo
a deep political and institutional transformation. Cuba remained loyal to Spain and
experienced sustained progress until 1860.72 Santamaría’s recent estimates point to an
annual growth rate of of around 1 percent for real per capita GDP between 1790 and
1860.73 Low rates of growth in a context of free trade, limited structural change and
political stability would have characterized the case of Brazil.74
Meanwhile, in the former Viceroyalty of New Granada, output per head
experienced a rise up to mid-nineteenth century and stagnated during its central decades
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in Venezuela.75 Stagnation of income per head has been, instead, conjectured for
Colombia.76
Economies in the Southern Cone show, in turn, sustained economic progress
after independence. Chilean GDP per head grew at 0.9 per cent per year over 1810-60,
though most of the improvement in per capita income took place after 1830.77
Available economic indicators suggest fast growth in the Buenos Aires region that
translated in an improvement of Argentina’s per capita income. Increases in population
and labour force, urbanization, and a significant rise of total factor productivity in
livestock production are among the distinctive features of post-independence River
Plate.78 Argentina’s littoral agricultural output per head grew at 2 percent per year over
1825-1865.79 If we assume that this sector was representative of the littoral’s economy
as a whole, while in Argentina’s interior provinces per capita income stagnated, a
population-weighted rate of growth of 0.8 percent per year would result for per capita
GDP.80 It does not seem far-fetched to assume that that Uruguay behaviour was similar
to that of the Argentine’s River Plate.81
If the fragmented evidence and conjectures for each country are used to project
backwards present day GDP per head, comparative levels of per capita income can be
obtained for the period 1820-1870. Moreover, by weighting each country’s per capita
GDP level by its share in Latin American population, an aggregate figure can be derived
for the entire region (Table 4). The implicit yearly growth rate between 1820 and 1870
is 0.5 percent. This apparently moderate figure is quite respectable in its historical
context and far above the recent assessment by Bates et al., who point to a growth rate
for Latin American per capita GDP of 0.07 percent per year, ‘or, adjusting for the
dubious quality of the data, about zero’.82
INSERT TABLE 4
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Do these results imply retardation that would, thus, be related to the way
independence occurred?
A glance at the evolution of per capita income levels suggests that when Latin
America is compared to the United States a sustained decline is observed for the period
1820-1870. A more informative picture derives, however, from a country by country
analysis. The scant estimates available suggest that while the relative position of
Mexico and Brazil to the U.S. halved, Argentina, Colombia, Cuba, and Venezuela
experienced only moderate relative decline, below world average, and Chile and
Uruguay kept their positions roughly unaltered.
However, falling behind the United States does not necessarily imply that
development opportunities were missed by the new Latin American republics. Lower
human capital to labour ratios (implied by life expectancy and literacy rates) and
disparate geographical conditions (average temperature, distance to the sea, and
latitude) suggest different steady states in Anglo and Latin Americas.83 Moreover,
historians’ insistence on the different institutional conditions at the time of colonial
emancipation in Anglo and Latin Americas (colonial inheritance, initial inequality of
wealth and political power, and property rights definition) suggest that it would be
unrealistic to expect in Latin America a similar performance to that of the U.S. in the
decades to come.84
When, instead, Latin America’s performance is confronted with that of other
world regions the picture changes dramatically. During the half a century after
independence, Latin American performance fell behind a handful of countries in
Western Europe but was comparable to that of the European Periphery and superior to
that of Asia and Africa.
16
Concluding Remarks
Disorder after independence increased transaction costs as political and
economic institutions were redefined throughout a lengthy and painful process. The
path to independence was quite different between regions: the way it was won and the
previous degree of commitment to colonial mercantilism conditioned the new republics’
performance. Independence may have exacerbated regional disparities. For Latin
America as a whole it took time for the gains from releasing the fiscal burden to offset
the tax increase to cover expanding governmental expenses that accompanied state
building.
The favourable evolution of quantities and relative prices of goods exported
suggests that removing the trade burden and opening up to the international economy
represented net gains for the economies of Latin America.
On the whole, during the half century after independence, real product per head
grew in Latin America at a similar rate to the world average and to that of the European
Periphery and far higher than the one prevailing in Asia and Africa. ‘Lost decades’
seems, therefore, an inadequate description of the period 1820-1870.
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Table 1 Transport Costs in Latin America c. 1842
[Sterling per Ton]
Average Freight Transport Cost
from England port to the capital
Argentina 2.0 0.0
Bolivia 4.5 19.3
Chile 3.8 2.4
Ecuador 4.5 15.0
Mexico 2.5 13.8
New Granada 2.5 45.0
Peru 4.0 1.0
Uruguay 2.0 0.0
Venezuela 3.0 4.3
Sources: C. W. Brading, ‘Un análisis comparativo del costo de la vida en diversas
capitales de Hispanoamérica (1842)’, Boletín Histórico de la Fundación John Boulton
Vol. 20 (1969), pp. 229-66
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Table 2 Per Capita Purchasing Power of Exports and British Investment per Head
[1880 Pounds Sterling]
Exports Investment
1830 1850 1870 1825 1865 1875
Argentina 0.26 2.10 2.87 0.90 1.29 8.83
Bolivia 1.11 1.50 0.93
Brazil 0.57 1.01 1.48 0.48 1.66 2.41
Chile 0.58 1.60 2.47 0.48 1.31 4.01
Colombia 0.32 0.38 1.14 2.79 2.04 1.18
Costa Rica 2.32 3.67 20.10
Cuba 2.30 4.53 7.97 1.60 0.88
Dominican Rep. 0.70 0.86 3.20
Ecuador 0.40 0.71 1.34 1.50
El Salvador 0.66 1.26
Guatemala 0.34 0.43 0.07 0.42
Honduras 1.00 0.62 16.98
Mexico 0.23 0.65 0.41 0.61 2.16 2.57
Nicaragua 0.75 0.61 0.10 0.30
Paraguay 0.26 1.24 5.77
Peru 0.09 0.76 1.75 0.72 1.16 11.18
Uruguay 11.20 8.09 3.66 18.18
Venezuela 0.40 0.67 0.90 2.06 3.46
TOTAL 0.84 1.07 1.55 0.56 1.45 3.50
Sources: Current values deflated with the British export price index in B.R. Mitchell,
British historical statistics (Cambridge 1988): Exports, P. Bairoch and B. Etemad,
Structure par produits des exportations du Tiers-Monde 1830-1937 (Genéve 1985) for
1830, and Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History, 1850 and 1870. Investment, Stone,
‘British investment’
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Table 3 Net Barter Terms of Trade in Latin American Countries, 1810-1880
[Average 1836-40 = 100]
Cuba Mexico Venezuela Colombia Brazil Argentina Chile
1811/15 61 85
1816/20 76 100
1821/25 115 143
1826/30 108 84 94 127 106
1831/35 100 95 105 107 125 107
1836/40 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1841/45 102 98 105 124 97 108 95
1846/50 86 101 102 109 104 104
1851/55 69 106 74 120 123 104
1856/60 62 100 80 157 115 165 105
1861/65 53 79 76 120 127 99
1866/70 56 94 71 127 89 105 97
1871/75 57 104 108 139 147 104
1876/80 57 116 112 178 173 108
Sources: Cuba, Salvucci and Salvucci, ‘Cuba’, 197-222; Mexico, Salvucci, ‘Mexican
terms of trade’; Venezuela, Baptista, Bases cuantitativas; Colombia, Ocampo,
Colombia; Brazil, Leff , Underdevelopment; Argentina, Newland, “Exports’; Chile,
Braun et al. ‘Economía chilena’.
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Table 4 Comparative GDP per Head, 1820-1870
(1990 International Geary-Khamis Dollars)
Growth (%)
1820 1870 1820-1870 1820 1870
(U.S. = 1)
Argentina 1249 1837 0.8 0.99 0.75
Brazil 652 680 0.1 0.52 0.28
Chile 607 1295 1.5 0.48 0.53
Colombia 346 463 0.6 0.28 0.19
Cuba 583 838 0.7 0.46 0.34
Mexico 693 720 0.1 0.55 0.29
Uruguay 1004 1880 1.3 0.80 0.77
Venezuela 347 529 0.8 0.28 0.22
Latin America (average) (8) 640 809 0.5 0.51 0.33
Africa 420 500 0.3 0.33 0.20
China 600 530 -0.2 0.48 0.22
India 533 533 0.0 0.42 0.22
Japan 669 737 0.2 0.53 0.30
East Asia (11) 599 647 0.2 0.48 0.26
Eastern Europe 683 937 0.6 0.54 0.38
Former USSR 688 943 0.6 0.55 0.39
Western Europe (12) 1245 2088 1.0 0.99 0.85
West European Periphery (4) 925 1237 0.6 0.74 0.51
United States 1257 2445 1.3 1.00 1.00
World 687 910 0.6 0.55 0.37
Note: For supra-national entities, population weighted averages are used. Numbers in
brackets correspond to the number of countries included.
Sources: Maddison, Historical statistics, except for Latin America. Volume indices of
Latin American per capita GDP were spliced with Maddison’s per capita GDP levels for
1990, expressed in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars.
Argentina, G. Della Paolera, A. M. Taylor, and C. Bózolli, ‘Historical statistics.’, in G.
Della Paolera and A. M. Taylor (eds.), A new economic history of Argentina
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(Cambridge, 2003), pp. 376-85 (plus CD-Rom), GDP, 1884-1990, spliced with R.
Cortés Conde, La economía argentina en el largo plazo (Buenos Aires, 1997), for 1875-
84. I assumed the level for 1870 was identical to that of 1875. Newland and Poulson,
‘Purely animal’, estimated Argentina’s littoral agricultural output per head grew at 2
percent per year over 1825-1865. I have assumed that this sector was representative of
the littoral’s economy as a whole, and that there was no per capita growth in
Argentina’s interior provinces. A population- weighted average casts a per capita GDP
rate of growth of 0.8 percent per year. Population data comes from Newland, ‘economic
development’.
Brazil, GDP, R. W. Goldsmith, Brasil 1850-1984: Desenvolvimento financeiro sob um
século de inflaçao (Sao Paulo, 1986), 1850-1980. Zero per capita income growth for the
early nineteenth century as suggested by Leff, Economic development’, was adopted. A
lower initial level and, subsequently, a higher growth rate would result if A. Maddison,
Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992 (Paris 1995), p. 143, assumption that per
capita income growth in 1820-50 grew at the same pace as in 1850-1913 were accepted.
Chile, Díaz, Lüders and Wagner, ‘economía chilena’.
Colombia, Kalmanovitz, ‘Nueva Granada’, 1820-1913; then, GRECO GRECO [Grupo
de Estudios de Crecimiento Económico], El crecimiento económico colombiano en el
siglo XX (Bogotá, 2002).
Cuba, Santamaría, ‘cuentas nacionales’.
Mexico, Coatsworth, ‘decline’, for the nineteenth century. Following Coatsworth,
‘Mexico’, I accepted a mild rise in GDP per capita over 1820-1845. INEGI, Estadísticas
Históricas de México, (México D.F., 1995), since 1896.
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Uruguay, L. Bértola y asociados, El PBI de Uruguay 1870-1936 y otras estimaciones
(Montevideo 1998). I assumed that Uruguay evolved as Argentina’s littoral between
1850 and 1870, and as Argentina as a whole over 1820-50.
Venezuela, Baptista, bases cuantitativas.
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